The objective of this paper is to assess whether Australian multi-sector managed funds are misclassified, and then, having found this to be the case, determine if this misclassification has any impact on fund performance. In this research we adopt a strong form of returns based style analysis to investigate a monthly sample of Australian multi-sector funds over the five-year sample period 2003:04-2008:03. The evidence provided demonstrates that insufficient attention has been paid as to whether fund managers are able to keep within their tactical asset allocation ranges and presents that misclassification exist for Australian multi-sector managed funds but that the effect on fund performance is not significant. Additional areas of interest worthy of further attention but not investigated within this paper include extending the work to investigate additional fund types (including superannuation) to determine if the results hold once funds are overexposed to certain asset classes in bullish and bearish market conditions. We find the current system of classification of managed funds on the basis of their stated objectives has significant room for improvement. Our findings demonstrate a lack of association, and the implication to investors is that, misclassification may not be a significant reason for fund underperformance. The paper adds to the literature by demonstrating that no association exists between misclassification and fund performance.
I Introduction
The stated investment objective or "style" of a managed fund is an important factor in aiding the decision making process for an investor. However, growing evidence suggests that many funds fail to adhere to consistent style profiles and "funds are misclassified" over time (Brown and Goetzmann 1997) . In this study, consistent with popular opinion, a fund is deemed to be "misclassified" when a fund allocates outside its stated range as disclosed within their product disclosure statement (PDS) and thus is identified as breaking its mandate (Kim, Shukla and Tomas, 2000) . Notably Brown, Harlow and Zhang (2009) show that failure to abide by a consistent style ultimately can lead to inferior performance.
The performance evaluation literature demonstrates that misclassification can impact negatively on investors in various ways.
(1) Investors are exposed to unforseen risks and therefore are unable to achieve personal investment goals as a result of the fund manager going outside of the mandated range for a particular asset class. This has never been more important given the global Existing studies have suggested that fund mangers who operate with an inconsistent style to that mandated within PDS are more likely to make asset allocation errors, have higher turnover and have overall poor performance compared to peer funds (Brown et al. 2009; Gallo, Phengpis, and Swanson 2007) . As a result of the disadvantages identified in the literature, the current market turbulence and lack of existing empirical evidence with respect to the impact of misclassification on performance, the question of whether funds in Australia are misclassified is topical and worthy of further attention.
Reasons for why misclassification occurs have been previously investigated (Anderson and Ahmed 2005) . The most persuasive argument is that fund managers try to time the market in certain sectors and asset classes by shifting their allocations into them regardless of a fund's stipulated mandate. A limitation of the existing literature is that most of the early work in this area has focused on US equity funds (Dibartolomeo and Witowski 1997; Christopherson 1995) . Some recent studies in Australia have extended the earlier work by focusing on multi-sector funds Faff 2008a, 2008b) . These types of funds are worthy of investigation given many investors choose from among multi-sector funds in order to achieve their long term retirement objectives (Benson, Gallagher and Teodorowski 2007; Brinson, Singer and Beebower 1991) . Multi-sector funds specialise in investing across a number of asset classes with each fund having unique weightings allocated to each asset class. These weights impact the fund's exposure to each asset class which in turn give each style a distinctive risk and return profile.
Motivated by the contributions of Brown et al. (2009) and Holmes and Faff (2008a) we examine whether Australian multi-sector funds are misclassified, and then, having found this to be the case, determine if this misclassification has any impact on fund performance. Using a monthly sample of Australian funds over the five-year sample period 2003:04-2008:03 we address the following research question: Do significant levels of misclassification exist for Australian multisector managed funds and if so what, if any, are the effects on fund performance? We find that a significant proportion of funds are misclassified but that no conclusive association is found to exist between misclassification and performance.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, a review of the existing literature related to misclassification and style analysis is provided. Section III describes the research design and managed fund sample. Empirical evidence and a discussion of our results are provided in Section IV while a conclusion and suggestions for future research are presented in Section V.
II Prior Studies incorporating Return Based Style Analysis
In order to provide contextual completeness for this investigation, it is worthwhile presenting a brief overview of style analysis. The philosophy or objective that a fund manager uses to make investment decisions regarding the securities and asset allocation of a portfolio is known as the managed fund's "style" (Sharpe 1992) . Equity fund managers can be classified into different styles based on the characteristics of shares that they invest in. Israelson (1999) explains how Morningstar determines whether or not an equity fund is classified as large/small value, large/small growth or a combination of both, based on an allocated price to earnings ratio and price to book ratio score for each of the shares in their portfolio. These ratio and scores are then used to calculate an overall price to earnings ratio and price to book ratio score. The scores can then be used to sort funds into their respective style classifications. Multi-sector funds however, typically classify themselves into five broad categories; income, defensive, conservative, balanced and growth. Each of these "styles" influences the asset allocation decision of the respective fund managers in terms of the weightings that each of six different asset classes 1 receive.
An illustration of the impact that investment style can have on the behaviour of a multi-sector funds is provided by Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986) using US data for the period 1974-1983. In this seminal paper the authors find that the asset allocation decision accounts for 94% of the variability of total portfolio returns (Brinson et al 1986, p. 43) . Further it was the study first to identify asset allocation and therefore style as being a major determinant of portfolio return variability. The findings were supported by Blake, Lehmann, and Timmermann (1999) , who reach a similar conclusion when examining U.K. pension fund data.
There are a number of methods that an investor can use to accurately determine a managed fund's style without needing to rely on what is stated by the fund in its PDS. One alternative method, and method of choice in this paper, involves using historical returns to identify a managed fund's asset allocation. This approach is commonly referred to as "style analysis" and was developed by
William Sharpe in his seminal papers (Sharpe 1988; 1992) . A second alternative, namely "holdingsbased style analysis" is described by Kaplan (2003) as using a bottom up approach wherein the fund's style is determined from the characteristics of the securities that it holds at various points in time. As to the effectiveness of the two approaches, ample evidence exists to support the widespread use of RBSA as a tool in determining a manager's effective asset mix. In a study which examined 3336 US equity funds between 1989 Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (2002 compared both approaches to style identification and found that in general the two give similar results. In opposition, a study by Horst, Nijman, and de Roon (2004) compared the two approaches using 18
US based funds and found that RBSA gave a better estimate of a fund's investment style and was also better at forecasting future returns. The reason for this is that RBSA tends to be more suited for identifying the actual factor exposures that are relevant for predicting future returns and also the risk exposure of the fund. Additionally Dor, Budinger, Dynkin, and Leech (2008) point out that RBSA main advantage is that it offers timely comparisons, gives analysts the ability to observe intra-period shifts in style, and allows for historical time series to be more readily constructed than is possible with data from actual portfolio holdings of funds. The main criticisms aimed at RBSA are not levelled at the methodology itself, or the theory behind it, but mainly at its application. For RBSA to be effective at identifying style it needs to be implemented correctly, with appropriate indices and an investment philosophy that is able to be captured by these benchmark indices. This was acknowledged by Buetow, Johnson, and Runkle (2000) . The desired characteristics of asset class benchmark indices are outlined by Sharpe (1992) who specifies that the indices used should be mutually exclusive, exhaustive, have returns that differ, and should therefore have low correlation with each other. This avoids a situation where there is confusion about where to allocate a weighting due to the returns of two or more indices behaving in a similar way. These conditions are best met when investigating multi-sector managed funds whose asset allocation strategies utilise asset classes which each have a unique index. For this reason the decision to use RBSA to examine multi-sector funds is perhaps the best application of the technique (Buetow et al. 2000) . The appropriate indices to use for Australian multi-sector managed funds which cover the six target asset classes have been identified by Faff, Gallagher, and Wu (2005 However, there is no shortage of conjecture as to the possible reasons (Chan et al. 2002) . One proposition is that a fund's investment objective is intentionally left vague so that there is a degree of flexibility that would allow for temporary deviations from the stated style. Attempts to time the market by shifting allocation into an asset class that is not dominant may also explain some temporary deviations from stated style. Another possible reason is that adverse incentives could exist for funds to misclassify themselves in order to make it difficult for investors to be able to accurately identify the risk associated with a particular fund's investment objective. The suspicion that fund managers respond to adverse incentive structures in a way which will make their portfolios look more attractive to current and potential investors is nothing new (Lakonishok, Armin, Thaler, and Vishny 1991) , that is not to say however that funds are deliberately misleading investors but that they may want to keep certain information to themselves. In doing this fund managers may be able to attract investors to their fund by achieving higher relative returns to funds of the same stated style at the expense of taking on higher risk. As Dibartolomeo and Witowski (1997, p. 34) phrased it: "the easiest way to win a contest for the largest tomato is to paint a cantaloupe red and hope the judges do not notice".
The majority of empirical evidence surrounding misclassification is US focused. Using realised returns from US mutual funds, Brown and Goetzmann (1997) and Dibartolomeo and Witowski (1997) found consistent results that misclassification within their respective samples was as much as 40%. More recently, Kim et al. (2000) found evidence of misclassification in as much as 50% of the mutual funds examined in their sample taking into account fund attributes and not relying on risk and return measures. With such a large proportion of US funds misclassified, the question of whether or not there are any negative consequences for investors becomes an important one. This is particularly the case in a setting like the Australian market where a high proportion of the population are either directly or indirectly involved with investments in managed funds 2 . Are investors facing significantly different levels of risk? Are they losing diversification benefits? What are the effects of misclassification on fund performance? Progress has been made towards finding an answer to these questions (Brown et al. 2009; Indro, Jiang, Hu, and Lee 1998) , but again the literature has been primarily focused on equity fund styles without much consideration of multi-sector funds, that are popular within the Australian market setting.
While the bulk of research is on equity funds, multi-sector funds have not been ignored. Holmes and Faff (2008b) In light of the fact, that we expect to reject the null version of the above hypothesis and find that Australian multi-sector funds are indeed misclassified, we then tackle the second part of our research question that addresses the association with performance. There is mixed evidence in the literature.
In the case of equity funds style inconsistency can negatively impact performance (Brown et al. 2009 ), whereas evidence exists to suggest a positive relationship exists for multi-sector funds (Holmes and Faff 2007) . In view of the mixed findings we test the following hypothesis to address the second part of our research question.
H A 2:
An association exists between misclassification and fund performance.
The null version of the above hypothesis will be verified in the testing process.
III Research Design and Data

Research Design
Returns based style analysis (RBSA) involves an application of an asset class factor model developed by Sharpe (1988; 1992) and introduced in Equation 1.
R it is the return on fund i in period t , F nt represents the return of factor n for fund i in which the factors are the values of the various asset class index returns and w in is the managed fund's style weight for asset class n. The error term it e is the proportion of fund return which is not explained by the combination of asset class indices and can therefore be thought of as the selection component of the model. To determine the style weights the variance of the error term must be minimized subject to the constraints that the weights sum to unity and be non negative. To achieve this Equation 1 can be rearranged to solve for the error as follows:
On obtaining results from Equation 2, the standard deviation of the error term (selection) can be thought of as the tracking error of the fund from its customised passive benchmark portfolio. The proportion of variance that can be explained by the fund's style is obtained from Equation 3. ) (
The right hand side of Equation 3 is equal to 100% minus the proportion of variance unexplained, while the left hand side indicates the proportion of variance explained by the n asset classes (Sharpe 1992) . A low R 2 can be explained by either high levels of selection in a fund, a frequent change in investment style during a period, or the fund investing in derivatives whose effects cannot be captured by any of the indices (Lucas and Riepe 1996) .
RBSA examines historical returns and gives estimates of the fund's true style weightings. Sharpe (1988, pp. 59-69) states in reference to the technique, "returns-based style analysis is not going to dissect the creature to determine if its DNA belongs to that of a duck, but it will tell you if it has enough duck like characteristics to qualify". To improve the efficiency of the technique this study will apply confidence intervals to the style weights by using the approach developed by Lobosco and Dibartolomeo (1997) . Before this approach was developed there was no good measure of the quality of fit for the estimated individual style weightings. To implement this technique the standard deviations of the estimated style weights are approximated using the following equation:
In Equation 4, the subscript i represents the index corresponding to the style weight being estimated σ a is the standard deviation of the style analysis, σ Bi denotes the "unexplained returns based style analysis index volatility" for index i, n the total number of returns used in the style analysis and k the number of market indices with non-zero style weights. B i represents the portion of the returns for index i which are not attributable to the other market indices. The standard deviation of this return series is known as the "unexplained Sharpe style index volatility". The confidence interval calculated for a style weight on a particular index will (1) increase with the standard error of the style analysis, (2) decrease with the number of returns used, and (3) decrease with the independence of the market index from the other indices used in the analysis. The practical benefits of having confidence intervals are that statements regarding the significance of style weights can be made. This is useful to the analysis conducted within this paper as it will allow for greater precision when determining whether or not the style weights are outside the fund's asset allocation range.
Due to its ability to accurately determine a fund's investment style, RBSA can also be used to evaluate whether the stated style is consistent with what is happening in practice. For example, in the case of equity funds it is a matter of examining which index is dominant based on the style weighting and then making a comparison with the stated investment objective. In this paper the task of identifying misclassification is more difficult given the emphasis on multi-sector funds. The problem is complicated due to fact that each of the five general multi-sector styles (income, defensive, conservative, balanced and growth) is comprised of a strategic allocation among six major asset classes. There exist dominant indices among these styles and are subject to intersection in terms of a balanced and growth fund both having Australian equities as their dominant index. In order to determine if a multi-sector fund has been misclassified, a comparison with the fund's mandated asset allocation range for each asset class is necessary. Multi-sector funds like all other fund types disclose via their PDS the specific investment strategy. In addition within the PDS it is stated what asset classes the fund will invest in and the range that the manager is, on average over the recommended investment horizon of the fund, mandated to abide by. These ranges are typically set under the premise that a fund manager will adhere to them on average over the fund's investment horizon, unless authorised by a majority of unit holders to deviate from the stated investment policy (Kim et. al. 2000) . On the basis of this evidence RBSA is a suitable technique to use to answer the first part of the contingent research question.
The second part of the contingent research question deals with the association between fund misclassification and performance. Using RBSA, individual customised benchmarks which represent the best linear combination of asset class indices are created for each multi-sector fund within the sample. The customised benchmarks are then used to asses each fund's risk adjusted performance so that comparisons can be made between them. To achieve this, the information ratio is calculated for each fund. The information ratio (IR) is intended to serve as a measure of the special information that an active portfolio reveals through its return (Goodwin 1998 The IR for each fund is then tested for statistical significance using the t-statistic in order to verify the null hypothesis for H2. Once the information ratio is calculated for each fund a comparison is made between those that are misclassified and those that stayed within the mandated asset allocation range. This allows us to determine whether or not the misclassified funds were able to achieve higher risk adjusted returns than the correctly classified counterparts. Ascertaining whether any observed differences are statistically significant is determined by conducting an independent samples t-test and then a Mann-Whitney U test for robustness.
To test whether a formal relationship exists between misclassification and performance cross sectional OLS regression is adopted, refer to Equation 7. leading to a situation of perfect multicollinearity the balanced fund dummy is excluded. As misclassification is determined by examining the result of RBSA, a dummy is included where 1 represents a fund being misclassified and 0 otherwise.
Control variables for fund SIZE and management expense ratio (MER) are included in Equation 7
to capture any effects that they may have on the findings. Fund size is calculated as the natural log of the average fund size over the sample period while the median MER over the sample period is used for the explanatory variable. A relationship linking performance to fund size has been previously investigated (Gallagher and Martin 2005; Sawicki and Finn 2002) . However, no consensus has been reached as to the nature of this link with studies finding either an inverse relationship or none at all. When including fund size in the regression the effect that it can have on MER needs to be explained. There is a documented inverse relationship between the two which is attributed to the effects that economies of scale can have in improving efficiency and reducing costs (Geranio and Zanotti 2005; Dowen and Mann 2004) . Further to this, Holmes and Faff (2007) document a negative relationship with performance, implying that higher MER is not necessarily associated with higher skill.
Data
This paper utilises monthly return data for a total of 246 Australian multi-sector managed funds for the period April 2003 to March 2008 4 . Managed fund return data was obtained using Morningstar direct (version 3.1.4), with defunct funds excluded. The requirement to remove defunct funds from the sample is largely unavoidable because if a fund does not have a complete return history over the sample period RBSA cannot be conducted. The sample consists of multi-sector funds split into five broad categories: defensive, conservative, income, balanced, and growth. Funds were segmented into these categories on the basis of their stated objectives and fund name. In cases where the fund name and objective are ambiguous then Morningstar's classification system was used as a proxy. The composition of the sample data is shown in Table 1 . Table 1 highlight's that the majority of funds are classified as either growth (40%) or balanced (26%). A possible explanation for this is that during the sample period investors were more optimistic than on average due to the strength of the market Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients for the six benchmark indices. It is evident that no two asset classes are perfectly correlated providing confidence with the reliability of the analysis.
Additionally, there exists a lack of options available for selecting an appropriate benchmark for these asset classes. An examination of the descriptive statistics, also presented in Table 2 , with respect to return and standard deviation illustrate these asset classes are different and therefore appropriate within the RBSA.
5 148 funds with a full data set of monthly returns were eliminated from our final sample due to insufficient or no information being available about the target asset allocation. 
IV Empirical Results
The ability of multi-sector fund managers to remain within their mandated asset class ranges and the association that this ability has with their capability to add value is the research question that is investigated within this paper. It is an important question that needs to be addressed from the perspective of both the individual investor and investment professional.
In order to address the first part of this question we first implement RBSA by minimising Equation 2 using Excel Solver to implement the non-negativity and the unity constraints required to perform the quadratic programming. In order to achieve this, six representative asset class indices are used to determine the mean style weightings of each fund over the sample period. The style weights are then used to break down fund return that represents a linear combination of the asset class style indices plus a fund-specific error term. The degree of style and selection are then calculated as shown in Equation 3 along with the unexplained RBSA index volatility for each asset class. R 2 is calculated for each fund following Equation 3. On average over the total sample the amount that style contributes to overall return is 88.62%. This finding over the sample period could be due to (i) low levels of selection from multi-sector fund managers (ii) or high levels of style consistency.
Based on the results from this study and previous studies in the literature, we find it unlikely that style consistency is the source of the high R 2 and attribute the figure to low levels of selection as being the likely explanation. A summary of the results of the style analysis is presented in Table 3 .
On average across all funds the most heavily weighted asset classes were AEQ (32.86) and IEQ (19.00). A preference towards equity type securities amongst multi-sector fund managers is
identified. An explanation can be attributed to an over representation of growth and balanced funds within the sample. This over representation has created a potential bias towards their respective styles that are known to invest more heavily in equities "an equity bias". Another interesting finding is the general lack of investment in the property sector, a surprising result given the strong residential and commercial property market in Australia over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Aside from property, the second least heavily weighted asset class is OFI (10.97) with funds in general looking towards the more familiar AFI class of investments (column 5) when including fixed interest assets in their portfolio. Returns based style analysis was carried out on all 246 funds within the sample. The estimated style weights (presented as percentages) calculated for each asset class represent the percentage a fund has allocated to that particular asset class. Mean values are reported with standard deviation in parentheses. The amount of return variability attributed to the funds style is given as a percentage in the eighth column. Additionally, The variability for selectivity (*) is identical to that for style in each case. In this table and all subsequent tables the abbreviations (in brackets) represent Australia DS marketaccumulation index (AEQ), MSCI World ex AU -Accumulation index, $A (IEQ), S&P/ASX 300 property trust indexAccumulation (LP), AU UBS Composite Bond Index -All maturities (AFI), CGBI WGBI World Non A$ All Maturities A$ (OFI), UBS AU Bank bill index all mats -Accumulation (CASH). Table 3 presents an overview of asset allocation across the five multi-sector fund categories. On average the role that style plays (refer to style, column 8) in fund return is fairly high among all styles with the minimum being 82.59% for funds classified as conservative and the highest is 92.09%
for balanced funds. This is not a large variation and suggests fund managers tend towards low levels of selection regardless of their style. As expected style weightings vary among the different investment objectives. An example of this variation is observed with funds that report to adhere to a growth objective. Prior expectations would suggest these types of funds, to have higher weightings in equities (AEQ and IEQ) than conservative funds, which is confirmed through the style analysis, 65.3% and 24.1% for growth and conservative respectively. As expected we find and report in Table   3 weighting similarities for funds with similar objectives such as conservative and defensive funds.
An unexpected finding is the high degree of similarity between growth and balanced categories when looking at their style weights (column 8). The only departure from this observation of note is that for AFI. Individual investors who choose to invest their savings in a balanced fund due to a perceived lower exposure to risky assets would be concerned with this finding, as would professional advisors who adhere to the prudent investor law.
Having created Sharpe style weights that allowed for inferences about the multi-sector managed fund's behaviour and composition to be drawn we then derive an approximation for the confidence intervals of those weights following Lobosco and Dibartolomeo (1997) . Making use of Monte Carlo simulation we are then able to verify the funds capacity to produce an effect under ideal conditions. A summary of the results obtained (upper and lower bounds) are presented in Table 4 .
Previous studies that have evaluated style analysis have tended to use the R 2 statistic as a measure of goodness of fit (Sharpe 1992) . The contribution of Lobosco and Dibartolomeo (1997) extended the literature to cater for a measure of the quality of fit for individual styles by deriving an expression that allows for the approximation of confidence intervals on style weights. The approximated confidence intervals can be useful in terms of disallowing certain combinations of market indices. In cases where indexes to be used to evaluate style are too similar, the confidence intervals will be unacceptably large. With reference to Lobosco and Dibartolomeo (1997) 
where σ a represents the standard error of the style analysis, σ Bi is the unexplained Sharpe style index volatility for index i, n is the number of returns used in the style analysis, k the number of market indexes with nonzero style weight and i the index corresponding to the style weight being estimated.
After performing the RBSA a significant number of funds were identified as being outside of their asset allocation range. Table 5 provides a summary of the findings. 83% Returns based style analysis was implemented to determine each managed funds estimated style weights and therefore identify which funds invested outside their mandated asset allocation range. A fund is deemed misclassified if it is outside its asset allocation range for any asset class. The number of funds misclassified is given as both a percentage of the total number of funds misclassified (refer to column 4) and as a percentage of the number of funds misclassified in a particular category (refer to column 5).
Out of the 246 funds in the sample 189 or approximately 77% of them were deemed to be misclassified. This finding allows us to reject H 0 that no significant levels of misclassification exist amongst Australian multi-sector managed funds supporting H A 1. Growth funds represented the category of funds that was identified as containing the greatest number of funds deemed to be misclassified (41.27%) with balanced funds coming in at a relatively close second place. When looking at the percentages of misclassified funds within each category we identify that balanced funds have an almost 90% rate of misclassification. This on the surface appears a high rate (90%) but when market conditions are taken into account it makes intuitive sense that this finding holds for the sample period investigated, given the bullish nature of the market. Fund managers, as indicated by the heavy concentration in equity type securities, overweighted their portfolios in growth assets. On the basis of the performance of the Australian all ordinaries market index over the sample period it is clear that Australian shares were highly desirable and included within multi-sector fund portfolios at the expense of remaining within the mandated fund objective. This is an alarming finding and one that will have serious ramifications in the event of a significant market reversal.
Further examination of dominant indices for misclassified balanced funds was undertaken in order to investigate whether or not they were overweight for AEQ. Of the 58 balanced funds misclassified 22 were outside their dominant index (AEQ) and of these 21 or 95% were overweight.
These findings support the previous assertion that balanced funds consistently broke their PDS mandate in order to take advantage of higher returns at the expense of exposing investors to higher risks and also possibly reducing their exposure to other asset classes through portfolio rebalancing. A similar assertion can be made in regard to growth funds which have the second highest percentage of misclassification. In total 29 growth funds were overweight in their dominant index. The fund styles with the least amount of misclassification among them were income and defensive. Closer investigation of each asset class index allowed us to identify the percentage of funds overweighted was slightly above those that were underweighted. It follows that these numbers would be fairly close together when fund managers overweight a particular asset class; they may have to underweight another. In total 91 funds were misclassified in their dominant index with 83 of those being overweight, suggesting managers may be attempting to time their fund's dominant index. How significant this finding is to investors is yet to be determined. Are managers who go outside of their mandated ranges doing so to take advantage of any special information they may have? Are these managers able to use this information or skill to add value? If so should investors really be all that concerned about misclassification. To answer these questions an analysis of fund performance is necessary.
To measure performance the information ratio was calculated for each fund. This ratio provides a risk adjusted measure that is useful not only for comparing skill across active managers but also for measuring a manager's performance above that attributed to investment style. The information ratio is arguably the best single measure of risk adjusted performance available (Goodwin 1998) . A top quartile manager will have an information ratio of one half or higher according to Grinold and Kahn (1999) . Following this evidence only 4 funds out of the 246 funds evaluated can be said to have done a good job. Those funds identified as qualifying for the top quartile include: one Income classified fund with an information ratio of 1.552 and significant at the 1% level; two funds with a classification of Balanced with information ratios of 1.081 and 0.937 respectively and found to be significant at the 5% level; and one fund classified as Growth with an information ratio of 0.754 and found to be significant at the 10% level.
As observed in Table 6 on average Australian multi-sector managed funds have not performed well. Not only did they not add any value, but also as the persistence of negative information ratios suggests they are on average eroding value. Only 4 funds were found to have significantly positive information ratios as opposed to 123 which demonstrated negative performance. The implication is that the bets managers make based on their special information or skill are not paying off and even in strong market conditions it is difficult to correctly select investments which add value over a style-specific benchmark. ( Different styles adopt different risk and return patterns based on their allocated investments as dictated by their unique objectives. Table 6 shows how on average each style of multi-sector fund has performed on a risk adjusted basis. It can be seen over the [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] sample period that balanced multi-sector funds (column 5) have been the best performing funds with the highest average information ratio of all styles. Of the 13 positive information ratios calculated for this category only 2 were significant at the 5% level. The only other categories that contain significantly positive information ratios are growth (column 6) and income (column 4) with conservative (column 3) coming in as the worst performing category with an average information ratio of -1.08, 15 of which are significantly negative at the 5% level. When comparing information ratios between styles it is important to note that the style with the highest ratio may not be the most suitable as no consideration of an investors risk aversion is taken into account. However the fund manager should be able to vary the tracking error and maintain the same information ratio on an ex-ante basis. Table 7 presents summary statistics for fund performance for both misclassified and correctly classified funds. From Table 7 it can be observed that misclassified funds have a higher average information ratio indicating that they are outperforming their correctly classified peers. Of the 30 positive ratios for misclassified funds 3 are significant at the 5% level and 1 at the 10% level.
Conversely for correctly classified funds 1 out of 6 is significant at the 5% level. What are the implications of this finding? Misclassified funds have benefited when all funds are grouped together, but when they are segmented into style categories there appears to be no difference. Investors should not be concerned about whether fund managers are keeping within their mandated asset class ranges. ( 
No. of negative c a s e s 1 9 1 8 1 1 4 8 6 7 1 5 9 The findings presented in Table 7 points to an association between misclassification and performance. This relationship had been examined by several researchers with the majority finding that performance and misclassification is negatively related. The rationale provided within the existing literature is that misclassification can lead to increased portfolio turnover as well as increased likelihood asset allocation errors by fund managers (Brown et al., 2009; Gallo and Lockwood 1997) . In line with popular opinion, the univaraiate analysis presented in Table 7, following Holmes and Faff (2007) , presents further evidence for Australian multi-sector funds of the existence of a positive association between style inconsistency and performance. With this positive association in mind a look at whether there is a significant relationship between misclassification, as defined in this paper following Kim et al. (2000) and the amount of value added by an active manager is necessary to determine whether or not investors in misclassified funds are benefiting from an active managers' superior information.
Previous literature on the link between fund size and performance is mixed, finding either no relationship or a negative one. Intuitively one might expect that larger funds are more difficult to manage based on the difficulty in finding enough good investments to invest in. However, no significant correlation is found to exist between fund size and performance 6 . The regression result is consistent with the correlation analysis and implies that managers of larger funds are not able to add any more value than managers of smaller funds. Along with size, a control for management expense ratio was included to take into account the effect of any possible economies of scale that may exist in larger funds. Again, no significant correlation was found to exist between the two suggesting that fund size does not bring about lower expenses. Interestingly, a significant negative correlation is evident between MER and the information ratio. This significant result is found to hold in the crosssectional regression analysis with results presented in Table 8 . The significant negative correlation finding is alarming as it implies that the higher the expense ratio the less is the value a manager adds which is opposite of what an investor would hope for and expect. If paying more in management expenses does not lead to better performance then why are investors willing to do so?
The cross-sectional results presented in Table 8 expose the impact that each style category has on performance. Out of five, only three are significant: balanced; defensive; and conservative. A positive association between risk-adjusted performance and style is evident but only in the case of balanced funds. The other significant style categories were negatively related to performance, which is not surprising considering that on average they had the lowest information ratios. The findings for defensive and conservative fund managers is not surprising given managers for these type of categories tend to be more passive by nature with respect to their investment objectives and therefore less likely to try to time the market.
The findings reported in Tables 6 through 8 reject H A 2 that an association between misclassification and fund performance exists. In other words, this finding does not allows us to reject the null version of hypothesis H A 2. Thus we conclude that no significant relationship exists between misclassification and fund performance providing support for the findings of Brown et al., (2009) . This insignificant finding between misclassification and performance is consistent with the segmented univariate results. As a result investors should generally not be too concerned with whether or not a fund manager is able to stay within the mandated ranges because any perceived impact that doing so has is only significant when funds are aggregated and no distinction is made between investment styles. Where D 2 =1 for conservative style and 0 otherwise; Where D 3 =1 for income style and 0 otherwise; Where D 4 =1 for growth style and 0 otherwise; Where D 5 =1 for misclassified funds and 0 otherwise. The t-statistic is recorded in parentheses under the estimated coefficient (statistically significant coefficients t-statistics are bolded). (*) denotes significance at 1% level, (**) denotes significance at the 5% level
V
Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research
The findings reported in this paper show that significant levels of misclassification exist for Australian multi-sector managed funds but that the effect on fund performance is not significant. The findings support the concluding remarks of earlier studies, like those of Kim et al. (2000) , Goetzmann (1997), and Witowski (1997) , that find the current system of classification of managed funds on the basis of their stated objectives has significant room for improvement. Using RBSA we find that 77% of multi-sector funds, with as much as 89% of balanced funds were misclassified over our sample period. Our findings suggest that in the case of multi-sector funds the proportion of funds that do not adhere to the reported stated objectives is considerably higher than the 50% of equity funds reported in the case of Kim et al. (2000) , and 40%
in the case of diBartolomeo and Witowski (1997). However, we also conclude that despite this alarmingly high proportion of funds acting in a manner inconsistent with their stated objectives, there is no evidence to support an association between misclassification and performance. The findings in this paper add to the literature by demonstrating that whereas in a down market misclassification impacts on performance as previously demonstrated in the literature (Brown et al., 2009) So what are the implications of misclassification to investors? Should investors simply ignore misclassification and give little attention to a funds mandated asset allocation ranges? The answer lies somewhere in between. While we find no direct association with performance, misclassification can still lead to investors being much more exposed to a particular asset class than they wish to be.
This paper provides further evidence on the misclassification of funds in a setting different from equity funds and provides impetus for future research into better fund classification schemes and greater monitoring of fund investments by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority in Australia, and other regulatory bodies of a similar ilk in other countries. Additional areas of interest worthy of further attention but not investigated within this paper include extending the work of Brown et al. (2009) to investigate additional fund types other than equity to determine if the results hold once funds are overexposed to certain asset classes in bullish and bearish market conditions.
However, for now investors and financial advisors can be safe in the knowledge that even though a very large percentage of Australian multi-sector managed funds are misclassified, the amount of value added by the active managers of these funds has not been adversely affected.
